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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND
ARCHITECTURAL REVIEW:
SOME SUGGESTED STANDARDS
ALLEN OSHINSKI*

Regulating the use of land through private restrictive covenants is an old idea. Such covenants can serve as useful tools for a
residential developer to achieve such goals ranging from controlling
the rate of growth of the area to providing for maintenance of common areas. One use of covenants which is gaining in popularity is
as a means of regulating the aesthetic quality of a development.
This is often done through the creation of an Architectural Review
Committee which must review and approve all plans for any building or renovation within the development.'
INTRODUCTION

Any attempt, whether public or private, to regulate aesthetics
is bound to generate controversy since aesthetic considerations are,
by nature, subjective. The adage "beauty is in the eye of the beholder" applies to architecture as well as it applies to any other subject of aesthetic consideration. 2 Nonetheless, a degree of aesthetic
regulation, if applied evenhandedly and with restraint, can be desirable. In any event, attempts to regulate the appearance of residential developments will not go away. The key, therefore, is to
establish standards to guide review committees so they can further
the legitimate goal of preserving the developmental scheme without
turning into petty tyrannies of the majority, enforcing blind
uniformity.
To balance the rights of individual property owners against
those of the community as a whole, the committee must make decisions pursuant to some type of standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Yet because of the subjective nature of aesthetic
* B.S., University of Illinois (1980); J.D., University of Houston (1985) Research Attorney, Illinois Appellate Court, Second District. Except as noted, the
views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. See infra notes 7-15.

2. See Palmetto Dunes Resort v. Brown, 336 S.E.2d 15, 19 n.2 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1986). The court noted that "[iun the thirteenth century Aquinas made a
stab at defining beauty: 'Beauty relates to the knowing power, for beautiful
things are those which please when seen.'" Id. (quoting St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologica, I-I, q. 5, art.4).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:939

judgments, formulating meaningful standards can be difficult. 3
This Article will briefly review the creation of a typical covenant scheme and look at some provisions for regulating a development's appearance. 4 This Article then examines how courts have
construed these provisions to require that enforcement be reasonable. 5 Finally, this Article suggests guidelines which can be incorporated in the covenant to ensure that the committee's decisions
6
will be not be artibrary.
I.

CREATION AND TYPICAL PROVISIONS

The essential element of an enforceable covenant of this type is
a common scheme or plan of development. 7 The documents, in
whatever form, must clearly establish the common plan. The restrictions must be applicable to all, or nearly all, the lots in the development. This can be accomplished in a number of ways:
conditions written on the plat itself, included on deeds, or provided
in a separate declaration filed contemporaneously with the plat.8
Any of these methods will provide sufficient notice to the purchaser
of the conditions and restrictions and establish the common scheme
necessary for enforceability. 9
Some typical conditions and restrictions which have been held
valid include those limiting development to residential uses 10 and
restricting such physical characteristics as setback lines.11 Frequently such covenants attempt to regulate the aesthetics of the development. The intent of such provisions is to ensure uniformity of
appearance and prevent unsightly construction which can be hard
on the eyes as well as decreasing the value of surrounding property. 12 This is typically accomplished by creating an Architectural
Review Committee (ARC) which must review and approve all plans
3. See id. (giving examples of statements made by great thinkers describing the subjectivity inherent in the formulation of aesthetic judgment).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 7-15.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 16-50.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 51-60.
7. See also Robert Kratovil, The Declaration of Restrictions, Easments,
Liens and Covenants: An Overview of an Important Document, 22 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 69 (1988); Wallace v. Hoffman, 84 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949);
see generally Thomas E. Roberts, Private Land Use Controls: Enforcement
Problems with Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes in North Carolina,22
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 793-94 (1987).
8. Kratovil, supra note 7, at 74-75; 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants § 168 (1965);
ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, Land Use Law § 151, at

1-65 (1989).
9. Kratovil, supra note 7, at 74-75.
10. Sherwood v. Rigsby, 581 N.E.2d 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
11. Chesebro v. Moers, 134 N.E. 842, 843 (N.Y. 1922).
12. Clark v. Rancho Santa Fe, 265 Cal. Rptr. 41, 49-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1981).
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for construction within the development. 13

Any proposal for construction on a lot covered by the covenant
must be submitted to and approved by the committee. 14 Such covestructures such as
nant provisions may also apply to appurtenant
15
decks, storage sheds, and swimming pools.

II.

THE FATE OF

ARC

PROVISIONS IN THE COURTS

Courts have generally enforced provisions requiring submission of plans to an ARC. 16 This does not mean, however, that the
ARC has unbridled discretion to impose its subjective vision of utopia on the entire development. The courts have insisted that some
standards be applicable to the committee's decisions, although the
standards need not be detailed and specific. 17 The majority rule is
that a covenant's architectural review provisions will be enforced
even absent detailed standards, subject to the rule of reasonableness. In other words, the committee's exercise of discretion must be
reasonable and not arbitrary.' 8 Unfortunately, determining what
is "reasonable" in this highly subjective field has not always been
easy.
Most of the reported cases have involved construction of a primary residence. Some basic principles have emerged from these
cases. First, building restrictions cannot be interpreted so as to
prohibit all use of the subject property. 19 Moreover, all covenant
restrictions must be construed narrowly and in favor of the free and
unrestricted use of land. 20 Nevertheless, the doctrine of strict construction will not be applied to defeat the obvious purpose of the
13. See, e.g., Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 449 P.2d 361, 362 (Colo. 1969)
(discussing dispute regarding architectural review committee).
14. See, e.g., Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, 593 N.E.2d 97, 98 (Ill.App.
Ct. 1992).
15. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Weiss, 605 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(basketball hoop); Westfield Homes, 593 N.E.2d at 100 (swimming pool); Amoco
Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 478 N.E.2d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (lightposts); Lindner v. Woytowitz, 378 A.2d 212 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (swimming pool);
Four Seasons Lakesites Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Dungan, 803 S.W.2d 173
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (driveway and retaining wall); Sherwood Estates Home
Ass'n v. McConnell, 714 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (dog pen); Gosnay v.
Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 666 P.2d 1247 (Mont. 1983) (fence and stable); Beckett
Ridge Assoc. v. Agne, 498 N.E.2d 223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (clotheslines);
DeNina v. Bammel Forest Civic Club, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(satellite dish).
16. Weiss, 605 N.E.2d at 1095; Westfield Homes, 593 N.E.2d at 101; Rhue,
449 P.2d at 362.
17. Clark v. Rancho Santa Fe, 265 Cal. Rptr. 41, 49-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp., 255 N.E.2d 326 (Mass. 1970); Palmetto Dunes
Resort v. Brown, 336 S.E.2d 15, 19 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
18. Weiss, 605 N.E.2d at 1906; Westfield Homes, 593 N.E.2d at 101.
19. Baker v. Henderson, 153 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
20. Weiss, 605 N.E.2d at 1095.
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covenant. 2 1 Thus, where a restriction is clear and unambiguous,
22
the courts will attempt to give it effect.
Covenant restrictions typically take a variety of forms, ranging
from the concrete (literally and figuratively) to the amorphous. Restrictions covering setback lines, 23 minimum floor area, 2 4 maxi26
mum height,2 5 and even minimum cost of the primary residence
can be applied with little more than a pocket calculator. In these
cases, the function of the ARC is essentially ministerial. 27 Other
provisions regulate such matters as color schemes 28 or the type of
materials which can be used. 29 As long as the committee does not
attempt to alter the standards unilaterally 30 and applies them in
an evenhanded manner, 31 courts have little trouble with these
provisions.
On the other hand, some covenants purport to give the committee broad powers to pass on proposed building plans solely on the
basis of appearance; in other words, purely aesthetic considerations. While such provisions have been viewed with some skepticisim, the majority of courts have upheld them in a given case, as
long as the committee's action is "reasonable." 32 Standards as
amorphous as "harmony of external design"33 or even "aesthetic
considerations" 3 4 have been held sufficiently straightforward to
permit enforcement. Obviously, however, such language is preg35
nant with opportunity for arbitrary enforcement.
One of the leading cases on this type of provision is Rhue v.
Cheyenne Homes.36 In Rhue, the plaintiffs wanted to move a 30year-old Spanish-style ranch into a neighborhood of modern split
levels. When the ARC refused to approve their plan, the plaintiffs
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Chesebro v. Moers, 134 N.E. 842 (N.Y. 1922).

24. J.P Bldg. Enters., Inc. v. Timberwood Dev. Co., 718 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986)
25. Jones v. Brown, 748 P.2d 747 (Alaska 1988).

26. Griffin v. Pence, 187 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
27. See Alliegro v. Homeowners of Edgewood Hills, 122 A.2d 910 (Del. Ch.

1955).
28. Trieweiler v. Spicher, 838 P.2d 382 (Mont. 1992) (committee rejected
homeowner's proposed use of gray because seven of last ten homes built used
gray).

29. Calvin v. Sinn, 652 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Stergios v. Forest
Place Homeowners Assoc., 651 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
30. Dodge v. Carauna, 377 N.W.2d 208 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
31. Normandy Square Assoc. v. Ells, 327 N.E.2d 101 (Neb. 1982).
32. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Weiss, 605 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992).
33. Normandy Square Assoc., 327 N.W.2d at 103.
34. Palmetto Dunes Resort v. Brown, 336 S.E.2d 15, 18 (S.C. Ct. App.
1985).
35. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
36. 449 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1969).
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filed suit. The court upheld the validity of the covenant provision
and had little difficulty in determining that the committee's decision was reasonable. 37 Whatever the merits of having a neighborhood consisting of nothing but modern split levels, the Spanish
ranch was clearly not in keeping with the character of the neighbor38
hood, and was not consistent with the scheme of development.
A few courts, however, have held that such an amorphous standard does not constitute a "scheme or plan" of development. 39 The
covenant at issue in Rhue contained no specific standards to guide
the committee. Where standards are vague or nonexistent, courts
do not simply give the committee unbridled discretion. Rather,
they will seek further guidance from the covenant's statement of
purposes or from a de facto common scheme or plan of development. 40 At the very least, this gives the court some basis by which
to review the committee's decision. In this way, courts have found
committee decisions unreasonable where the committee sought to
impose standards stricter than those expressly contained in the
covenant, 4 1 rejected a proposal where identical proposals had previously been approved, 42 or imposed restrictions or prohibitions in
37. Id. at 363.
38. Id.
39. These courts have usually said that "aesthetic considerations" is simply
too vague to consitute a "plan or scheme" of design. In Alliegro v. Homeowners
of Edgewood Hills, the court upheld the decision of the architectural review
committee to disapprove plans for a house which was considerably smaller than
others in the development. 122 A.2d 910 (Del. Ch. 1955). The court noted that
restrictions on cost, setback and floor area, providing fixed standards, were subject to nondiscretionary enforcement. In dicta the court questioned the board's
authority to disapprove plans "for aesthetic or other reasons." Id. at 912-13.
Another Delaware court later cited Alliegro for the proposition that "where the
language used in the restrictive covenant is overly vague, imprecise or so unclear as not to lend itself to evenhanded application, then the grant of authority
is normally not enforceable." Seabreak Homeowners Assoc. v. Gressner, 571
A.3d 263, 269 (Del. Ch. 1986). The covenant at issue in Seabreak authorized
the ARC to reject plans for aesthetic or other reasons and to consider the
"suitablility of the propoesd building . . . the harmony thereof with the surroundings and the effect of such improvements . . . on the outlook from the
adjacent or neighboring property." Id. at 267. The court railed at this "imprecise, vacuous" language, finding that the term "outlook" in particular had no
objective standards permitting it to be applied in an evenhanded manner. Id.
at 270. The real basis of the Seabreak court's decision, though, was that the
committee attempted to use the general "outlook" language to justify imposing
a setback requirement which conflicted with a setback requirement elsewhere
in the covenant. Thus, the decision did not really turn on the committee's application of aestheic considerations, but on its arbitrary enforcement of the language in the covenant itself.
40. See., e.g., Boiling Springs Lakes v. Costal Servs. Corp., 218 S.E.2d 471,
478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); Young v. Tortoise Island Homeowners Assoc., 511 So.
2d 381, 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
41. Boiling Springs Lakes, 218 S.E.2d at 478; Seabreak, 517 A.2d at 270.
42. Trieweiler v. Spicher, 838 P.2d 382, 383 (Mont. 1992).
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addition to those expressly contained in the covenant. 4 3
III.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH AUXILIARY STRUCTURES

Another problem of interpretation involves the application of
building review procedures to auxiliary structures such as swimming pools. Many covenants expressly include such structures
within the authority of the ARC. Others which apply to all "structures" or all "buildings" have been interpreted as applying to these
44
auxiliary buildings as well.
Presumably, outbuildings could be banned entirely. Many covenant provisions expressly list certain types of prohibited construction. A recent appellate court decision applied the principle of
incluso unius est exclusio alterius, holding that the committee could
not prohibit the building of a structure which was not specifically
45
banned.
In Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, the defendants purchased a
home in a subdivision developed by the plaintiff.46 The declaration
of covenants, conditions, restrictions, and easements provided that
plans for any construction or remodeling on the premises had to be
submitted to the ARC. The declaration specifically prohibited construction of certain structures, including television antennas,
clotheslines, and satellite dishes. 47 The Herricks submitted plans
for, among other things, an above-ground pool, which was not listed
among the types of structures which were specifically prohibited. 48
The committee refused to approve the plans for the pool and when
defendants persisted with construction, plaintiff brought suit to enforce the declaration. 49 At trial and on appeal, Westfield took the
position that the committee could refuse to permit a pool under any
circumstances. 50
The appellate court held that the committee could not entirely
prohibit construction of a structural type which the declaration did
not specifically bar. In so holding, the court stated as follows:
[W]e agree with the trial court that the blanket denial was unreasonable under the circumstances. Nothing in the covenant states that an
above-ground pool will be prohibited under any circumstances,
although other items are specifically prohibited. Nothing in the record
43. Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 568 (Tex. 1981); Young, 511 So. 2d at
384.
44. Lindner v. Woyotowitz, 378 A.2d 212 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Greenberg v. Koslow, 475 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Plymouth Woods Corp v.
Maxwell, 181 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1962).
45. Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, 593 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 100.
48. Id. at 99.
49. Id.
50. Westfield Homes, 593 N.E.2d at 99-101.
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indicates that defendants' proposed improvements would be unsightly
or in 'singularly bad taste.' The court offered plaintiffs ample opportunity to promulgate reasonable conditions for the construction, but
plaintiffs chose not to submit such conditions to the court. Plaintiffs
could, for example, have required fencing around the pool area, which
would have addressed concerns about noise, visibility and safety. We
in denying
conclude that the trial court did 5not
1 abuse its discretion
plaintiffs a permanent injunction.
Westfield indicates that an ARC is limited to establishing reasonable design standards for proposed improvements and may not
ban a class of improvements entirely unless it is specifically prohibited by the declaration. This rule puts prospective home purchasers
on notice of exactly what types of construction will be permitted
while protecting surrounding owners from particularly noisy or unsightly structures. The court suggested that the committee could
reject, for example, a structure which was to be "bright yellow with
52
chartreuse polka dots."
As the court interpreted the covenant, the committee could
have conditioned its approval on, for example, the construction of a
fence around the pool, or use of a color scheme which was consistent
with that of the house. This interpretation effects the purpose of
banning construction which is particularly unsightly without unduly hampering the homeowners' ability to enjoy their property.
This sounds easy in practice, as exemplified by the yellow-and-chartreuse example. However, when the consideration is purely aesthetic, the questions can blend, literally, into subtle shades. The
problem is, how can the committee be given the freedom to make
inherently subjective judgments while still operating pursuant to
meaningful standards?
IV.

A.

SUGGESTED STANDARDS

PrimaryResidences

With primary residences, the problem of developing workable
standards is at least manageable. As noted above, restrictions such
as minimum floor area and minimum cost provide objective criteria
to guide committees and courts alike. 53 Of course, some of these
provisions are similar to restrictions contained in municipal building and zoning codes. 54 Care should be taken to avoid confusion
created by conflicting standards. 55 Other specific types of restric51. Id. at 102.
52. Id. at 101.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
54. P. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 3.01[1], at 3-4 to 3-12
(1992).
55. Cf Seabreak Homeowners Ass'n v. Gressner, 517 A.2d 263 268 (Del.
Ch.) 1986 (ARC imposed setback requirement at variance with covenant, which
incorporated county zoning ordinance).
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tions can also be used. For example, a covenant might include a
specific list of permissible architectural styles. A number of
planned developments seek to maintain a particular style, such as
colonial. In such a development, a home designed in a contrasting
style would appear out of place and detract from the character of
the entire neighborhood. Such a structure need not be inherently
ugly, it is only out of place. The Spanish ranch in Rhue might well
have been lovely in its own right; it was merely out of place in a
neighborhood of modern split-levels. 56 In the same way, a modern
split-level might be out of place in a historic neighborhood of Victorian homes.
It seems that the covenant could also regulate color schemes,
thus addressing the chartreuse-polka-dot situation. 5 7 Regulations
covering choice of building materials would have the salutary effect
of controlling the quality of the construction as well as the appearance, again, assuring the overall desirability of the neighborhood.
All of these standards permit relatively objective enforcement without requiring the committee to delve into subjective questions con58
cerning appearance.
In their most benign sense, these types of restrictions permit
the residents of a development, acting through the ARC, to determine the characater of the neighborhood. Since covenants are essentially private contracts, there is no element of official coercion,
as there is when communities practice exclusionary zoning. A prospective purchaser who doesn't like colonial architecture, for example, would be ill advised to purchase a lot in a subdivision which
restricted construction to that type of home. Other developments
certainly exist which are more compatible with his or her tastes.
Each of these types of restrictions provides several advantages.
First, they can be set out with specificity in the covenant. Thus, a
prospective purchaser will know with relative certainty what a person can build and what he or she cannot. Second, they reduce the
risk of arbitrary enforcement. The ARC can enforce the community's collective value judgments without imposing a tyranny of the
majority. The danger that the committee members can use the covenant restrictions to discriminate against their prospective neighbors is virtually eliminated.
Any claim of such improper
enforcement can be easily addressed by reference to the covenant.
Third, the committee's job is made easier. Although the value judgments embodied in the covenant are inherently subjective, their application on a case-by-case basis is mechanical. A red, white and
blue colonial is either permitted or it isn't. In this way the commit56. See supra text accompanying notes 25-39.
57. Westfield Homes, 593 N.E.2d at 102.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 25-39
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tee members are insulated from the wrath of their neighbors because they are merely applying objective criteria contained in the
covenant, and a prospective purchaser has notice of what is
permitted.
B. Auxiliary Structures
For many people, a "dream home" contemplates more than just
four walls used as a residence. It may include swimming pools,
decks, screened-in porches, storage sheds, satellite television
dishes, and other "auxiliary structures" surrounding the primary
residence. These outbuildings may be connected to the main residence or may be freestanding. Such structures have the potential
to pose even greater problems than the primary residences for developers and neighbors alike. While a house may be ugly (subjectively speaking), it is unlikely to generate noise or odor or be an
attractive nuisance to neighborhood children.
This suggests that the concerns in regulating auxiliary structures are somewhat different than those involved in regulating primary residences. Even in an architecturally diverse neighborhood,
neighbors may be legitimately concerned about the noise and light
generated by a swimming pool or the unsightliness of a giant satellite dish in the front yard.
Initially, structures which are prohibited under any circumstances should be clearly defined in the covenant. If swimming
pools are deemed undesirable in the development, this should be
clearly stated up front, so that the aquatically inclined will be on
notice that they should look elsewhere. If the prohibited list is intended to be nonexclusive, this too should be clearly stated,
although this immediately introduces an element of uncertainty.
Beyond the intial list of prohibitions, the covenant drafters can
attempt to provide regulations for other types of structures which
are to be permitted. The primary type would be maximum square
footage requirements for decks and swimming pools. Such a requirement is entirely objective, and can be enforced by the committee with only a tape measure and a calculator. Other restrictions
could include relatively specific guidelines for screening, grading,
and landscaping of auxiliary improvements.
In addition to regulating aesthetics such provisions can promote the health and safety of the neighborhood by reducing the
danger inherent in swimming pools and similar structures. Here,
perfect objectivity is neither possible nor desirable. A covenant
could provide, for example, that a pool be screened by trees or
shrubs. But what are appropriate plantings will depend on a
number of factors, including the lay of the particular lot, the nature
and extent of native vegetation and landscaping elsewhere on the
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property. Here, then, the committee must perform its essential
function: determining whether the proposal is appropriate under
the circumstances, guided only by its own common sense and the
rule of reasonableness.
Guidelines for color schemes and materials may also be appropriate. Again, these will not be entirely objective, but will permit the committee to function within a specific framework.
CONCLUSION

Increasingly, developers have found it desirable to regulate the
future appearance of their developments through the use of restrictive covenants regulating construction on all lots in the community,
which are applied and enforced by architectural review committees.
A developer desiring to use such a procedure must walk a tightrope.
If the restrictions established in the covenant are too narrow and
specific, they will not have the desired affect. If they are too broad
and vague, courts will find them unenforceable as giving the committee unbridled discretion. These provisions must be carefully
drafted to provide the committee with guidance without unduly restricting it in effectuating the covenant's underlying purpose. For
this reason, it is desirable to make the restrictions and prohibitions
as specific as practicable, with reference to objective criteria.
Although purely aesthetic judgments are inherently subjective, it is
possible to draft covenants in such a way as to provide reasonably
objective standards to guide the committee in its interpretation of
the covenant's provisions.

